<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><xml><records><record><source-app name="Biblio" version="6.x">Drupal-Biblio</source-app><ref-type>27</ref-type><contributors><authors><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Earle, J.S.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Spicer, A.</style></author><author><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sabirianova, K.Z.</style></author></authors></contributors><titles><title><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Community norms and organizational practices: the legitimization of wage arrears in Russia, 1992-1999</style></title></titles><keywords><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">and Labor Costs: General (J300)</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">arrears</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Compensation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Contracts and Reputation</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Current Heterodox Approaches: Institutional</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Evolutionary (B520)</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Formal and Informal Sectors</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Illegal Behavior (P370)</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Institutional Arrangements (O170)</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">institutions</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">legitimacy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Networks (L140)</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">norms</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">organizational practices</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines (A120)</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Russia</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Shadow Economy</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Socialist Enterprises and Their Transitions (P310)</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies: Legal Institutions</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">sociology</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Sociology of Economics (A140)</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Transactional Relationships</style></keyword><keyword><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">Wages</style></keyword></keywords><dates><year><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003</style></year><pub-dates><date><style  face="normal" font="default" size="100%">2003//</style></date></pub-dates></dates><urls><web-urls><url><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">http://www.upjohninstitute.org/publications/wp/03-97.pdf</style></url></web-urls></urls><publisher><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research Staff Working Papers: 03-97</style></publisher><language><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">eng</style></language><abstract><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">What role do community norms play in the diffusion and persistence of new organizational practices? We explore this question through an examination of the widespread practice of wage arrears, the late and nonpayment of wages, in Russia during the 1990s. Existing research on wage arrears most often examines this practice as a means of flexible wage adjustment under difficult economic conditions. We develop an alternative theory that explains wage arrears through their acceptance as a legitimate form of organizational behavior within local communities. Our empirical analysis finds some support for the neoclassical position that wage arrears reflect adjustment to negative shocks, but this perspective fails to account for a number of important facts, including a high level of arrears among apparently successful firms. In contrast, our results find strong support for the institutional perspective. The statistical analysis demonstrates powerful and robust community effects both in firm adoption of this practice, controlling for firm performance, liquidity, and fixed firm effects, and in workers' reaction to arrears, through their quit (exit) and strike (voice) behavior.</style></abstract><notes><style face="normal" font="default" size="100%">: 03-97, 2003 Working Paper</style></notes></record></records></xml>